Battle of Northampton 1264

Treachery or complacency? The battle of Northampton, 5 April 1264

King Henry III won one major battle during his reign. Some chroniclers attributed his victory at Northampton to an act of betrayal, but is this supported by wider evidence?

I recently went on BBC Northampton to talk about the battle fought at the town on 5 April 1264 – the “other battle of Northampton,” as the radio presenter, John Griff, put it.

As John mentioned, when most people think of the battle of Northampton, their minds may wander to the Wars of the Roses, and the great Yorkist victory on the banks of the Nene in 1460.

But two centuries earlier, there was another, much lesser-known battle at Northampton which also pitched a king of England against his magnates.

The battle of Northampton, fought on 5 April 1264, was the first major encounter in what is now known as the Second Barons’ War - the conflict fought between royalist forces loyal to King Henry III of England and a rebel faction led by Simon de Montfort, sixth earl of Leicester, between 1264-67.

The battle saw the king successfully capture Northampton from rebel forces - commanded by Simon de Montfort the Younger - on 5 April 1264. The battle did not last long, and the rebels that could retreated to the castle. But their resistance was short-lived, and they surrendered the following day.

Despite being the first clash in the war, the battle is often overlooked – perhaps because the much larger and more impactful battle at Lewes, fought just six weeks later, completely overturned the royalist success at Northampton.

In this article, I want to focus on one intriguing aspect of the battle of Northampton: why did the town fall so quickly? And what does this tell us about the barons who were defending it?

Into the breach

It is clear that the royalists gained entry at the north-west section of the town, where the walls skirted the gardens of St Andrew’s Priory. King Henry seems to have sent a force to the town’s south gate to draw the attentions of the defenders, while another detachment was sent to assail the walls at St Andrew's. This was successful, with a section of the wall collapsing.

Simon de Montfort the Younger raced to defend the breach, and fought courageously to push the royalists back. But it was to be in vain. One chronicle tells us that Simon’s horse faltered in the town ditch, causing him to fall and be captured. Some of the barons fled to churches in the town, while others withdrew to the castle.

Treachery?

Almost as soon as the fighting was over, rumours began flying that the monks of St Andrew’s priory had been in cahoots with the king, and had aided the royalists’ entry into the town. The Dunstable annalist reported that ‘the prior, it was said, had treacherously weakened’ the walls, and had indicated his ruse ‘to the king and his men.’ This particular chronicler does demonstrate some bias towards the Montfortians, however, and was perhaps keen to invoke betrayal to explain the barons’ failure to resist the king. Indeed, as Treharne wrote back in 1955, it is only those chroniclers of a baronial persuasion that mention this feature of the battle. The pro-Montforitan William Rishanger, however, was at pains to push this narrative, even writing that the prior, a Frenchman named Guy, was later imprisoned by earl Simon.

So, with suspicions arising over the narrative accounts, can the story be verified in the documentary records?

Perhaps it can. The patent rolls show that, in October 1264, when Simon de Montfort had effective control over the realm, St Andrew's priory was transferred to the control of Crown, before being given to the custody of the prior of Wenlock in February 1265. Then, just two weeks after king Henry was restored to power at the battle of Evesham, Guy was reinstated as prior.

It should be noted that there is no clear reference to treachery on Guy’s behalf in the record evidence. His treatment at the hands of Montfort’s regime may simply have been driven by political differences rather than a specific act. The prior’s rapid reinstatement by Henry suggests he was of a loyalist persuasion. As Treharne observed, earl Simon’s actions may well show that he believed the accusations of Guy’s treachery, but they do not prove the accusations themselves.

Complacency?

Even if prior Guy was behind the royalist’s initial success at Northampton, he cannot have been responsible for the other apparent failings of the barons. It is striking that, having lost control of the town, those that retired to the castle, led by Peter de Montfort, surrendered the following day. How can we explain this?

Here we have a dilemma, in that several sources suggest that the castle’s and town’s defences were in poor shape a few years before the battle. In 1260, the castle was reported to be in dilapidated state, with some of the towers lacking roofs and the west wall in danger of collapse. This could either mean they were weak at the time of the battle, or, conversely, strengthened by 1264. We cannot know for sure.

However, none of the narrative sources indicate that the castle’s weakness was a factor in the decision to surrender, and the fact that the rebels withdrew there suggests it offered some defensive merits.

Walter of Guisborough, writing later, says that the castle did not have the necessary victuals to hold out. If this was the case, then it reflects very poorly on the barons. Clearly, it was anticipated that the castle should be able to resist – this is demonstrated by the earl of Leicester’s advance from London to relieve the barons when he heard Northampton was under attack. He had reached St Albans when news reached him of the capitulation, and he turned back.

The failure of the barons to properly provision the castle at Northampton, if true, betrays an attitude of complacency that is hard to understand, given the town’s importance to the Montfortian's strategic position. The destruction of the rebel lands in the weeks following the battle would have made the cost of such complacency bitterly apparent.

A great - but overlooked - victory

Northampton was to be Henry III's only victory in battle during his entire reign. As an act of war, it was a brilliant success. Regardless of whether the prior had helped him or if his scouts had identified a weak section of the walls, his decisive approach reflects sound generalship. The fall of Northampton gave Henry a free hand to devastate the rebel heartlands in the Midlands beyond. Unfortunately for the king, his catastrophic showing at Lewes, just six weeks later, meant his victory at Northampton was destined to be overlooked.

If you'd like to know more about the 1264 battle of Northampton and the Second Barons' War, please feel free to contact me.